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Connotations of
Worldview

by Roger Henderson

T

wo general tendencies can be distinguished in
the use of the term worldview (weltanschauung), tendencies that reveal profound differences, which I
propose to examine in this essay. The two connotations give rise to two very different assessments
of talking and thinking about worldview. Those who
discourage its use often identify it with an unprincipled pluralism or relativism; those who favor
its use identify it with a web or system of beliefs
with a common denominator, a system that clarifies implications for life and vocation. 1 Although
there is no mention of anything like worldview in
Dr. Roger Henderson, formerly Professor of Philosophy
at Dordt College, now lives in the Netherlands, where
he writes and teaches in the Spice Program (Studies
Program in Contemporary Europe, at the Gereformeerd
Hogeschool, Zwolle).
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the Bible, the importance of what a person thinks
and believes is stressed throughout. 2 If attention
to worldview serves this emphasis without compromise, it is beyond reproach. Before we can
clearly distinguish the two connotations, we must
consider what quite generally is at stake in the idea
of worldview. My overall goal is to show that discussions of worldview can be very valuable, while
pointing out certain ways the notion of worldview
can be misunderstood and misused. I start with a
brief definition and then turn to the history of art,
reflecting on the fact that each people and culture
inevitably portrays things in their own characteristic way. This, I suggest, indicates the presence of a
worldview.
A good way of approaching the idea of worldview, I contend, is that there is “beneath and beyond
all the details in our ideas of things…a certain esprit
d’ ensemble.” 3 This French expression, used by Orr,
is insightful: It says there is something that colors
and gives flavor to the content of what a person or
group believes. It implies that such an esprit unites
all the particulars into a consistent whole. It also
means that something comes about out of a certain
arrangement of details that displays this esprit. Such
a “spirit” is that which enables all the details to fit
together in the first place, like a hidden “logic.”
Something is shared that goes beyond individual
details while imparting unity and character to
them as a whole. The esprit is an overall meaning
and impression arising in and through everything.
Like the “spirit” of the law often spoken of, it is
something better, more life-giving than anything
simply evident in the details or parts of our ideas of
things. It is something under, over, and above all

the parts as such, a shared quality or feel. As such,
it denotes the web-like structure of human belief(s),
the coherence of life as reflected in thought, the interconnectedness of thought and reality. Worldview
depends upon the unity of human existence and
the coherence of it (and thought) as fitting together
within one creation. Like the “spirit” of the law,
the meaning of worldview is sometimes better,
more beneficial than what people at times make of
it. Yes, talk of worldviews can, like everything else,
be misused and misplaced. But this misuse does
not detract from its intrinsic value or the insight it
offers us into reality.4

and recognition always occur within some frame
of reference, it seems natural to us to assume that
what the two artists see is the same. This amounts
to saying, however, that the lake’s true appearance
is what is captured in a photograph. Yet, when we
look at a photo, we automatically compensate for
its flatness, point of focus, shadows, size, and texture discrepancies, repeatedly reminding ourselves
of what the various things in the picture “stand
for.” Skillful representative works of art do this
and much more for the viewer, although the viewer
will still compensate for certain “discrepancies.”
We read a lot into a photograph and somewhat

In his book Art and Illusion, a study in the psycholog y of pictorial representation, E.H. Gombrich considers the following question: “Why is it that different ages and different nations have represented the
visible world in such different ways?” 5 Think, for
example, of how differently landscapes are represented in Medieval as compared with seventeenthcentury Netherlandish painting. Or imagine two
artists, one from China and one from England, sitting in front of the same lake, making a drawing or
painting of it. Even though we know that seeing

less into a painting. Paintings involve more selecting and poignant presenting of what the artist considers important for us to see. Still, we wonder why
the artist who paints the lake in the Chinese fashion does not see what we (seem to) see and gladly
accepts what we consider the discrepancy (between
what we see when we compare her painting with
a photo). Why doesn’t she see the same thing we
do and notice the obvious difference between her
lake and what we see (there, or) in the photo? She
doesn’t see the same thing we see probably because
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she considers its Chinese look or style to be true
and correct—a look which to her the lake obviously
does have and to us it obviously does not have. We
tend to think in a similar way about accents: people
who don’t talk like us have accents—but we don’t,
or at least we think we don’t. 6

A worldview is like a certain
encryption code allowing us
to open, organize, and “place”
the things we see within
familiar categories.
Compensation factors are always at work. We
make allowances for discrepancies of appearance,
caused by bad lighting, distorting weather conditions, and uncharacteristic momentary looks, in
order to portray and bring out what something is
“really” like. Familiar objects can suddenly look
strange in certain environments, just as strangers
can sometimes be mistaken for familiar persons. A
lot of what we perceive is what we have been taught
and (come to) consider important. Similarly, when
someone says something in a foreign language, it is
hard to even make out the sounds, let alone what
(s)he is saying. Goethe once said that people hear
only that which they understand. The uninitiated
eye or ear is not very open to what is just there.
A good (picture) frame tells us how and where to
look; it should intimate the kind of painting we
are meant to see; the frame also tells us where the
little world (and story) of the painting starts and
ends—even though a frame (work) is not made to
be consciously noticed. 7
Like any other picture, the Chinese lake painting (above) presumes to reveal what is important
and real about the lake but perhaps not obvious
to us at first. After seeing the painting, we may
be able to see the lake in the Chinese fashion and
appreciate important facets of the lake previously
hidden to our view; the profound and skillful artist
highlights what is most savored, worthwhile, good,
or true, rendering this service to the viewer. And
here we have a parallel with worldviews—they
12
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give us eyes to see and understand what otherwise
might have gone unnoticed. Although artistic limitations can never be excluded from explaining variety in representation, the very existence of artistic
schools, styles, and traditions tells us that like (verbal) languages, artistic conventions of representation are not merely individual but communal—as
are languages, accents, and worldviews. We tend to
see, think, and talk about things as do our friends
and like-minded community. For these and other
reasons to be mentioned later, I argue in this essay that worldviews are communally held, shared
perspectives, or ways of thinking, passed down
from old to young. This means that they are not
the same as philosophy or religion—philosophy
being more analytical and abstract, religion being
an all-embracing way of life and not limited to a
way of thinking.
A worldview is like a certain encryption code
allowing us to open, organize, and “place” the
things we see within familiar categories. One of
Gombrich’s main points throughout his book is
that “to see a few members of a series is to see
them all”; 8 and this is one of the keys to how perception is assisted by acquaintance with a worldview, a category, type, or kind. The operative
word in the quotation is “members.” What makes
a member a member is that it shares in the same
esprit or spirit. In this way things fall into certain
categories as members of groups or kinds—and acquaintance with these assists discovery. Similarly,
once a person has become aware of a certain esprit,
style, or brand, for example, of architecture, music, or clothing, it becomes easily recognized anywhere. A brand is like a man-made generic type
or kind. You need only hear a few bars or catch a
quick glimpse of something to know that it is one
of that kind. Acquaintance with a type or kind is an
identifier that tells a whole story. This is similar to
the way worldview-awareness works and assists us.
Familiarity with one tells us a great deal about what
to expect from members of the community possessed
of it. The reason for this correlation is that reality
is highly integrated; things are tied together with a
thousand bonds constituting kinds and types in a
coherence, not an aggregate of things just standing
side by side. Attaining a “view” of a whole affords
an implicit, intuitive, or tacit grasp of many things,

and this grasp is something a worldview offers.
Equivocal Perceptions
Related to worldview, a relevant question today is
no longer just whether different people living in
different cultures and ages perceive things in different ways but the significance of one and the
same person perceiving one thing in different, incompatible ways. It has become popular to present
one thing that can be seen in two different ways,
such as the rabbit-duck or the young-woman/oldwoman drawings.9 While there is a certain fascination in perceiving “one thing” in two ways, such
experiences can also be unsettling. If the world and
any one thing can be perceived in different ways by
one and the same person, does this mean there is
no such thing as truth? Is truth, then, paradoxical?
In spite of its problems, this is a conclusion many
people feel driven to draw, once they have experienced a plurality of contradictory perspectives.
And if correct, wouldn’t this plurality of contradictory perspectives undermine any legitimate idea of
worldview?
In the eighteenth century, philosophers aware
of the problems raised in accounting for perception and knowledge argued that knowledge arising
from sense experience is subordinated to necessities of
the structure of the human mind (“Vernunft”).10 The unintended eventual consequence of this argument
was the permanent separation of reality into subjective and objective realms, with consciousness
now being primary and independent. We will return to this momentarily. Many people now believe
that there is no single right way of looking at reality,
no single right worldview, only incompatible perspectives and “incommensurable paradigms.” 11
Negative Connotation
As some writers understand the term, worldview
has the connotation of unmitigated “perspectivism,” implying that humans are fogbound within
their own perspective, or system. (Those who actually believe that they themselves are fogbound
like this might be asked how it was possible that
they made this discovery, given that they were supposedly captives within their own system.) If talk
of worldview assumes or necessarily leads to such
“perspectivism,” it is understandable that it has

The rabbit/duck, a wood engraving, from Germany,
is Kaninchen und Ente, published in Fliegende Blätter,
1939. The young woman/old woman drawing is
from an unidentified German postcard of 1888,
called “Junge Frau oder Hexe?”drawn by the English
artist W.E. Hill, Punk magazine, USA, 1915.

been greeted with distrust and skepticism.
This connotation exemplifies a key feature of
modernism, namely a preconceived notion of a gap
between that which is seen and anything that might
exist outside of perception—an assumed chasm
separating consciousness and a so-called external
world. It suggests the primacy or ultimacy of views.
Pro Rege—June 2012
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Everything that is seen is then a matter of (consciousness and) someone’s view. Accordingly, what
we see is a result of our angle or vantage point but
even more of our prejudice, will, linguistic conditioning, and cultural bias. Here we detect the modernist and post-modernist attitude of suspicion and
a complete rejection of the long venerated, classical
and medieval assumption of an adaequatio re et intellectus, a coordination of viewer and viewed.
The contemporary relativist attitude considers
perception to be “underdetermined” by any collection of ingredients, either internal or external. This
attitude, then, has moved away from that of the
eighteenth-century modernist philosophers, who
contended that the observer is furnished with certain “standard equipment,” which when used to
process the input from the senses produces reliable knowledge. While that “modernist” approach
was clever, it was soon interpreted as meaning that
beauty and everything else was indeed only in the
eye of the beholder. This view is part of the background of the negative, subjectivistic connotation
of worldview. According to contemporary relativists, neither the structure of human subjectivity,
nor the structure of what is, uniformly produces
what is perceived. Knowing is controlled, not by
a set of regular human faculties or by what is, but
by random, ever-changing factors in the viewer—
unconscious interests and desires. Knowledge is
ultimately a matter of perspective, a way of seeing
and perceiving. In this view, total human autonomy
is assumed, the idea that human beings have an
unlimited control and are completely self-determining. But ironically, this very view can switch
at any moment to its own opposite, into the view
that nature is determined and is an all-determining
mechanism—over which humans have little or no
control.
The nativity of this relativist perspectivism, which
we have been discussing, is sometimes ascribed to
the German Idealist philosophy of Kant, Fichte,
or Schopenhauer. This ascription is ironic, however, since Kant, at least, believed he was pointing out the standard equipment and various rational necessities controlling human perception and
knowledge-acquisition, including the assumption,
or postulate, of a world. While he believed he was
giving a firm basis to scientific knowledge, his
14
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philosophy eventually achieved the opposite in
the popular mind. Perception came to be seen as
more subjective than ever and less connected to a
known (or even knowable) world. Reality outside
of the human mind became ever more hypothetical. By ascribing to “inner sense” or “intuition”
(Anschauung) a universal role in knowing, “intuition” took on an exaggerated importance. It
(Anschauung) was also connected by Kant to the
notion of world (Welt in German), giving us the
German term Weltanschauung—which might have
been more correctly translated world-intuition instead of world-view. In any case, it was only a new
name for something not new—a perspective of
the whole. 12 Although worldview is sometimes given
a bad name because of such associations—and
hence has led some (Christian) writers to conclude
that it is a contaminated and dangerous notion—
there is little good reason to surrender the term to
this negative usage or confuse it with a proper definition or connotation.
Positive Connotation and Use
Ideally speaking, a worldview represents a unified “life-conception,”13 affirming and indicating
how the many facets of life fit together. Things
are meant to line up, fall into place, and constitute
“their own kinds.” While there are legitimate differences in perspective, these are not caused by
any supposed indefiniteness or unknowability of
the world; instead, they arise out of both the richness of creation and the limitations or fallibility of
human knowing. For example, some beliefs are
distorted, based on a limited or mistaken acquaintance with things. Yet the world is far from being
an unknowable thing in itself or a mere aggregate
of parts. Just the opposite is the case; it is so rich
in meaning that there is practically an inexhaustible diversity of pictures that can be drawn of it
(including any one of its lakes) without exhausting
its meaning. This is so, partly because of its temporal character—things go through phases, grow and
develop in time, repeatedly revealing a new gestalt.
The break, gap, or fragmentation that can sometimes alienate knower and known is not original
but adventitious, signifying dysfunction and break
down, not a shortage of meaning, reality, or truth.
A worldview may color but cannot create what

is there, or all of what is perceived. While every
worldview has its limitations, both internal inconsistencies and faults in its account of reality, there
is usually some visible hint of these limitations, especially when they are very mistaken in some way.
Whether a person takes seriously the hint or light
coming through the cracks in the wall depends
upon the person’s courage, integrity, and good
faith.
Failure to follow up indications of problems
can be disastrous. This truth became painfully
clear to me in talking to the parents of friends I
made while studying in Germany in the 1980s. As
Christian teenagers, they had all joined the Hitler
Youth League—Hitlerjugend—and saw nothing
wrong with it at the time. After many questions
and much discussion, at least one thing (hint) came
out in each case that, if followed up, could possibly
have opened their eyes to the surrounding evil—as
it did to the youth of Die Weiße Rose group in 1941.14
One such missed hint was briefly witnessing the
horrible condition and mistreatment of a group
of prisoners—quickly “explained” by a parent as
treatment reserved for “traitors to our country”—
which allowed the terrible sight to be categorized,
sanitized, and forgotten until much later. Another
case was the family’s (of one of the people I talked to) being told by long-time friends, who were
Jewish, “You must never visit us again, because it
could put you in danger.” The family could not—
did not work hard enough to—understand what
this warning signified.
In a significant way, sinful human beings are
still at home in this world and often have opportunities to rectify or compensate for its present
brokenness. We are made for learning and created for discovery—we are supposed to become
acquainted with God, his handiwork, its kinds, its
regularities, and its patterns, i.e., its unity and interconnections. An eye for worldviews can assist
in this process. Although there are ways in which
we seem to know God directly, what we grasp
(of Him through Scripture) is understood largely
through our perspective and experience in creation. Scripture often instructs us by comparing
God to the behavior of things around us, like birds
caring for their young or shepherds keeping their
sheep or the sun rising anew each morning.

Worldview properly refers to a coherence of beliefs within a world for which humans were well
suited—and this is its proper connotation. It grants
only a secondary importance to “view,” since “a
view” is not quite the same as “the truth.” Some
of the differences between the two connotations
are a matter of emphasis, one focusing on human
volition and consciousness, and the other seeing
human life as coordinated with what is there, the
order and laws by which God governs and sustains
the universe. A proper awareness of worldview is
meant to alert people to the way (primary) beliefs
attract similar (secondary) ones, repel contrary
ones, and form unified belief-systems. Knowledge
of a worldview can alert a person to far-reaching
implications and consequences of first principles.
No one can avoid having some perspective, with
its own direction, guiding thought along certain
lines, showing it where to go, and indicating concordant action.
There is a limited number of first principles or
primary beliefs, and this means that worldviews
are seldom if ever individually but rather communally held. Belief is understood here as a commitment with a specific character and a potential cost
if upheld in practice.
Worldviews also map things out, give guidance and direction to human thought and action,
but motivate only in a secondary sense, not with
the driving force of religion. Factors such as fear,

In a significant way, sinful
human beings are still at
home in this world and often
have opportunities to rectify
or compensate for its present
brokenness.
greed, and pride also play a big role in motivation
and sometimes work against or in the opposite
direction of a person’s own worldview. By inclining persons to act contrary to what they (say they)
believe, such cravings commonly give rise to dissonance and confusion within their worldview.
Pro Rege—June 2012
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Because fear, greed, and pride are not in accord
with the deepest confession of the heart, they act
as foreign or inauthentic motivations—not rendering the satisfaction to people of having acted with
the courage of their convictions or of having done
what they knew was good and right.
A number of key points can now be summarized. People are unavoidably possessed of beliefs
and assumptions about reality. These beliefs and
assumptions constitute not mere collections but
“comprehensive frameworks.” 15 As we have seen,
people are not possessed of unrelated individual
beliefs simply standing side by side, like marbles
bouncing around in a bag, but rather are possessed
by congruent systems, webs, or frameworks of belief, each with a distinctive esprit of its own. If human beliefs and “belief-forming processes” were
essentially singular or atomic, we would have a
hard time making sense of the mutual attraction
of similar and repulsion of contrary beliefs. This is
one of the most remarkable characteristics of the
way human beliefs work, that is, the appearance of
systems or families of beliefs bearing a common
spirit.
Since some beliefs have greater weight and authority, more and farther reaching implications, than others, these may be thought of as primary beliefs. For
this reason, beliefs form hierarchical structures in
which the primary ones take the lead in coloring
the whole framework or worldview. Because beliefs
are drawn together to form webs, or systems, it is
rather uncommon to find a person whose thoughts
combine diametrically opposed primary beliefs.16
When a primary belief is altered, the change usually has far reaching ramifications, whereas the
changing of a secondary belief or opinion occasions little notice.
The attraction and repulsion of human beliefs
that give rise to systems of belief and worldviews
make blatant inconsistencies and contradictions
within a worldview all the more interesting and
puzzling. If things function and work as they are
supposed to most of the time, why don’t they always work in this way? This question requires
more attention. For the moment we can only be
reminded that the presence of dysfunction does
not contradict the existence of normal or proper
function but rather reinforces it.
16
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Assuming for the sake of argument that every
normal adult human has a worldview, we should
ask whether it is final or subordinate to something
else more profound and all-controlling. A worldview represents a person’s primary beliefs, yet it depends upon something deeper, namely, a person’s
religion, religious commitment, or religious state.
In general, worldview is subordinate to religion.
Worldview depends upon but is not the same as religion; it reflects religion’s intellectual structure or
bent. Religion is more than a set of ideas or way of
thinking to which a person acquiesces. It has a vital or lived-out quality that transcends both theory
and ideology. Religion involves being connected to
something that transcends visible reality and embraces the divine in some way. To be divine is to be
self-existent, dependent on nothing else.17
A key biblical term in connection with religious is heart. Although an adequate account cannot be given here, something must be said about
this word because of its frequent use in Scripture
in connection with a person’s basic religious orientation. This is not the modern usage of heart as
organ of infatuation. The heart is the center from
which all kinds of activity begin. The heart is said
to devise plans, to think, to speak. Sometimes
it is said to be foolish, darkened, divided in allegiance. The tongue speaks, but the heart is far off;
or the heart speaks, but something in us is unable
or won’t listen. We are in the bivalent position of
being both its keeper and its dependent—we rely
upon it for guidance, initiation of action, but we
must also guard it carefully. Scripture speaks of the
heart as having its desires, which are often (but not
always) given by God. In a sense, it can’t be defrauded or dissuaded from doing what it is set on,
either for good or for evil. We can pretend we want
to do one thing, but if there are other plans (priorities or treasures) in our heart, they will prevail.
(This is not the level at which worldviews operate,
although it is the place out of which they grow and
receive direction.)
I have tried to show that worldview is more
than a mere convention or human construction yet
less than a simple given of nature. It appears to be a
way human beliefs cluster themselves together and
divvy themselves up to form patterns or systems
of belief. This process initially happens without

great conscious effort. It is learned, but it first happens at an intuitive level; and like a person’s native language (for example, English), it normally
needs education in order for its facility in use to
be gained; refinement and cultivation are necessary
and beneficial.

The willingness to test our
ideas against experience
repeatedly and adjust our
view of kinds and types
accordingly is a perennial
goal of a Christian
worldview, true science,
and philosophy.
Assumptions about “Kinds”
As described above, knowing that a certain person
has a certain worldview is a little like acquaintance
with a (natural) kind: once you have recognized it,
you have a way of anticipating behavior in that kind
and that person. Without going into detail about
the status of natural kinds, I should say something
about assumptions, since it is often said that acting
on the basis of one or another is inevitable. When
we say “fruit,” “worldview” or “human being,”
“chair,” “act of courage” or “dog,” do we refer to
a universal—or only names coined in experience
for convenience sake? The standard views are that
their existence is either (1) ontological (Plato), (2)
conceptual (Aristotle), (3) verbal (Ockham), or
what one Christian author takes to be a matter
of (4) creation disclosure (H. Dooyeweerd). This
distinction is significant because it affects the importance attributed to experience in contrast to the
use of reason, models, paradigms, or perspectives,
particularly in the sciences—the role attributed to
empirical input. In attempting to explain patterns
or regularities, one can easily overlook any (new)
factors that don’t easily fit within the familiar, established perspective. This means that there comes
a moment when the usefulness of an established
theory, paradigm, or (world) view has shrunk, and

the expansion or renovation of the familiar perspective is needed. You will be able to make sense
of the new experience or observation, only when
struggle (imagining and borrowing) has yielded a
new or renewed perspective. This idea of struggle
implies the limited practical validity of the Platonic
and Aristotelian notions of inborn or fixed “forms”
because in both cases, these notions have (in principle) a very limited openness to correction by experience.
Degrees of Openness
While the process of seeing and recognizing things
always occurs within some frame of reference, each
community is more or less open and has a greater
or lesser willingness to face certain things that are
unknown and to learn from them. To recognize
“new” things requires openness and imagination—stretching oneself and one’s perspective—
to go from the known to the unknown. There are
various types and degrees of openness, for example, to instruction, to correction, and to what
is there, outside of us, waiting to be experienced
and discovered. Indeed, the rise of modern science has been credited, in part, to the third view of
“kinds” outlined above—late medieval nominalism. By accepting the idea that kinds and categories
are human models, constructed by using language
and numbers to formulate the regularities of experience (as laws), various thinkers began forsaking
Platonic or Aristotelian deductive methods (based
on universal “essences”) in favor of more tinkering-based, inductive methods of studying nature
and a more malleable approach to kinds.
However, the idea of being completely open to
experience and using only induction is an illusion,
since complete openness would only mean indiscrimination and pretending that theories arise automatically (as Francis Bacon imagined). The willingness to test our ideas against experience repeatedly and adjust our view of kinds and types accordingly is a perennial goal of a Christian worldview,
true science, and philosophy. 18 Human knowledge
is not a copy or mirror of nature; it is a human account of what is behind the observable regularities,
historically qualified articulation of formulas, laws,
and decrees holding for the behavior and function
of creation.
Pro Rege—June 2012
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Worldview Benefits
Thinking in terms of worldview can help us recognize the logically consistent inferences of our beliefs. Knowing that a certain person has a certain
worldview (biblical or otherwise) sometimes makes
it possible to anticipate accurately what his or her
opinion will be on various issues. Each particular
community with its own intellectual-spiritual orientation has its own worldview and key insight.
Behind each such community (and worldview) is
locked a criterion for selecting, interpreting, and
arranging life and pursuing certain goals. Even
an implicitly held worldview offers an interpretive
framework for identifying and understanding (or
sometimes misunderstanding) other communities (of
belief), cultures, and historical periods.
As a result, a worldview allows identification in
two ways—one for the identifier and one for the
identified. Because each community (or collective,
partly) embodies a worldview, each is distinctive
and identifiable, making it possible for a person
familiar with it to pick out its members. To know
or have knowledge of something also involves acquaintance with its effects. We don’t know what a
lake is like just by looking at it. Acquaintance with
its kind and all other types and kinds can tell us a
great deal and assist us in recognizing the things
we meet. Without such knowledge, we would have
to experience each unique individual, its operation,
it actions, its doings, and its effect upon us, in order
to know what it is.
Pictures and Truth
I now return to questions raised earlier about seeing two images in one picture. By concentrating
on one or another of the leading features of a picture and taking one’s cue from that feature, one
determines the image one will perceive. 19 I dare
say, nobody can see both images at the same time,
but one can move quickly back and forth between
the images. We are inclined to ask, “Which of the
images is the real thing?” We know from the visual compensating we do that we can be fooled
and tricked, and it may be the artist’s intention to
do just that. We also know that the caterpillar becomes a butterfly, that dead-looking wood branches produce gorgeous colored blossoms, that every
coin has two sides, that the tiny baby becomes the
18
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large adult; but we assume that a thing is one thing,
with a single identity, when pressed to determine it.
When Jesus says that the same tree cannot produce good and bad fruit and that the same well
cannot bring forth sweet and bitter water, he is not
unaware of changing cycles over time. Indeed, it is
time that is the key to the changing images we are
discussing. That one thing can function in many
ways over time poses no problem; a hammer can
be both a paper weight and a nail driver, a car can
offer both shelter and transport, and a light can offer both heat and illumination.
If one can pick out an image in a cloud as children often do, and then another and another, is
there any problem with that? And if a third thing
can be seen in the rabbit-duck drawing, should that
be troubling? As a rule, things start out as one thing
with a specific function; they can then change or
be changed. Changing and transforming things is
essential to artistic activity. The mutability of materials, their susceptibility to change and molding, is
the condition of artistic work. Even if one thing has
many (possible, potential) functions and images,
one function or image almost always starts out as
the chief, even if another soon takes over.
All of this illustrates the richness and fecundity
of creation—mentioned earlier. There is wonder
stored up in a thing made by a very imaginative
Creator. “There are more things in heaven and
earth my dear Horatio, than is dreamt of in your
philosophy,” says Shakespeare’s Hamlet.20 And if
one asks what is really there when one is looking
at the different images in the clouds, the answer
may have to be that it is just a cloud, and a drawing
is just paper and ink—although as the handiwork
of God, there is so much more that we cannot describe it all.
Presence in the World, Absence On-Line: A
Cyber-Sized World-View
What about images on the computer? What effect are the long hours of sitting in front of our
computers and Internet screens having on our life
and world-view? Prior to the late 1980s, people in
a few occupations spent long hours sitting in front
of their typewriters. Now millions spend most
of their days looking into screens, staring at texts
and pictures on their computers. While our world

(view) is hugely enlarged in the narrow electronic
channels of the streaming audio-visual information presented to us on the Web, it lacks presence
and depth of perspective, it lacks the grounding
of boundaries, of location in space, and the lastchance limitations of time. Although the Internet
can show us places and things from all over the
world, everything we experience takes place right
in a room while we are sitting at a table, staring
into a screen.
It is hard to say what influence the On-Line
illusion of presence and the reality of absence is
having, in particular, upon relationships. While it
is often said that the Internet brings people closer
together, in some ways the opposite is true. It certainly can increase the frequency and number of
people we reach—with the touch of a button—but
it is contact with no price. The ease with which we
can fire off an email to a person or include someone in a group message facilitates cheapness of intent and shallowness of content. It breeds disregard
in both sender and receiver. One is reminded of the
emptiness of computer-generated birthday cards
sent by agencies. The lowering of the threshold to
writing someone is having a questionable effect on
relationships. Can it make for better, more authentic communication? Even the act of speaking to
someone on the telephone asks for a higher degree
of engagement and sincerity. The lowered contact
threshold affects the depth and intensity of the
communication and relationship. Writing no longer requires special effort, nor results in a tangible
artifact. It can be done with any motive or scarcely
any motive at all.
Why do people sometimes travel all the way
across the country just to be with another person—even for only a few days or hours? What’s
the difference between just talking to people on a
telephone or through a computer screen and being
in the same place together, present with them? In
both cases, we can see and hear each other. What
bearing or effect does being present together have
upon us compared to communication at a distance
by electronic means? Being present gives to and requires of us something more. Being absent eliminates touch, smell, and a sense of nearness. All
parties are less vulnerable; the possibility of being
uncomfortable or frightened by the other person,

or of imposing or being imposed upon is diminished. We can be quite indifferent towards one another and hardly notice it when apart. Acting and
pretending are much easier and the temptation of
insincerity greater.
Virtual presence and actual absence can also
affect what we consider natural, intuitive, or selfevident and as such may alter the basis upon which
we draw conclusions and make decisions. It can
bring about a kind of insensitivity or numbness,
because it is more partial (virtual) than we realize.
It can both open up and stunt the growth of young
people. For some, it becomes a replacement for a
real (social) life. It allows people to withdraw into
exclusive networks of friends and family, no longer

The more people live
a web-based existence,
the more their frames of
reference and world (view)
shrink....
needing anyone else, allowing them to close themselves off from all other contact. It makes it easy
to stay within all their limitations and fears. It has
also become a major source of addiction to many
people, particularly addiction to game playing.
The more people live a web-based existence,
the more their frames of reference and world
(view) shrink, though they can be jolted back to
fuller presence and awareness. By shrinking these
limits, we land in utopia, precisely nowhere. In
one sense, being On-Line is to be no place except
in our heads, at least until we move away from
the computer screen. Our worldview becomes a
Google-sized, filtered Internet portal (under constant surveillance). It is a controlled environment.
There is no out-of-doors available On-Line. We
control much, and are controlled: if we don’t wish
to meet someone, we can click off—delete is always only a button away; and yet no one is ever really with us. We are more in contact than ever and
less in contact than ever—firewalls (and worlds)
away from reality and other people. What this will
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do to us in the long run remains to be seen, but at
present it allows us to create a sense of a man-made
world(view) without presence: a universe in which
much good talk about God can still end up sounding awfully hollow.
This nowhere Utopia fits well with a public
philosophy that tells educated Western people they
are in control of themselves, that what they do and
think is within their own power, that they are autonomous—a law unto themselves. Many believe
humanity is in charge of itself, can recreate itself,
can wholly recreate the world. Yet when I walk
down the street and smell something appetizing,
something in me can crave it even if I do not wish to
have any such craving. Before consciously deciding
to get up in the morning, I sometimes notice I have
stood up and am heading for the wash room. Many
things bypass my will, such as appetites, instinctive
cravings, longings. These may indicate something
I need but don’t at the moment want. Sometimes
there is cultural interference between my ideas and
my needs—because of certain notions or fears I
have acquired. Indications of need are sometimes
overlooked, ignored, or suppressed—like a craving to eat something with the vitamins in it I need.
We can learn by observing such operations in ourselves. Their message is that there is more to me
than I think, will, or consciously understand. Our
thirst does not arise from our worldview—even
though our thirsts, too, are trained, for example, to
want water, wine, milk, or coke.
Conclusion
Rather than thinking of ourselves as autonomous
“individuals,” unattached to the rest of reality, we
should recognize our relation to it, including all the
ways our thought patterns are meant to reflect it;
the many interconnections largely constitute our
peculiar existence. These interconnections do not
mean, however, that our thought lacks all originality or independence. Thanks to the way God
has made and sustains us, we are not robots! Yet
thankfully we constantly meet with hints of organizing structure(s) in and outside of ourselves.
We perceive in freedom, in orderly ways, by virtue
of divine ordinances and law—to which we are,
thankfully, always subject—yet not in bondage.
Under the best circumstances, there will be a good
20
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match between our views of the world and the way
the world is. The fit, however, will never be perfect
or exhaustive because for that, the creation is far
too rich and dynamic.
Our perspective on life reflects and corresponds in varying degrees to an order that is larger
than ourselves. It is intimated to us even in a fallen
world and even through a less than perfect worldview. Beginning in earliest childhood we are instructed by intuition, instincts however minimal,
and a tacit awareness of the arrangement of the
world prior to our thought becoming self-conscious and focused. Such intuitive and tacit functioning is wonderfully evident in language, the way
speech is learned by infants even before they realize what they are doing; they begin to talk and express themselves using signs or words long before
analysis or independent understanding develops.
We want and try to talk even before possessing a
vocabulary because we are human beings—made
to talk. Being so made is what allows us to learn,
develop, and acquire language in the first place.
Reality is made to be spoken of, and we are made
to speak of it. Things are created to be known, and
we are created to know them, to gain a view of the
world and to gain acquaintance with God.
While there is nothing foolproof about the way
all this human learning and “viewing” takes place,
we constantly receive hints and indications telling
us when we are right and when we are wrong, by
the test of time and experience. Self-awareness and
observation are there to teach us basic knowledge,
and they far exceed what we consciously control.
In a tacit way, we discover that many things are
happening, are being suggested to us; we are being
asked to respond to these things—some of which
we eventually realize in a deliberate way. Many
signals, however, go unnoticed because our worldview is off the mark, more a constricting ideology
than an expanding vantage point. Sometimes we
learn more about the world by careful observation of our own intuition and tacit awareness of
things than by looking at things directly or by what
we are taught. The ideas of our culture, or what
experts and celebrated thinkers tell us, can easily
be false. Cultivating an awareness of the esprit d’
ensemble of all the things people think and believe
offers the attentive observer an extra filter and a

valuable guide in sorting out what is (most likely)
true. Recognizing that there is always one or another interpretive framework in play can be greatly
instructive to us and lead us to deeper insight into
ourselves, others and other communities.
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